online lostsh.github.io 2345-browser-lock | 2026-11-17 rfc 3514: evil bit not set
post 14 2026-11-17 windows | pup | kernel-driver 53 min

A Microsoft-signed driver to keep 2345 as your default browser

Windows | PUP | Kernel driver | Telemetry 12 min read

A Windows program asks for administrator rights and calls itself "安全中心", Security Center. Once its monitor is on, it watches which browser opens your links. If you switch the default away from the 2345 browser in Windows Settings, it shows a pop-up with a green button that reads "开启保护(30)", Enable protection, and counts down from 30. Do nothing and it undoes your change and locks the default. Started with one command-line switch, it also installs a kernel driver that can refuse or quietly redirect registry writes. Microsoft signed that driver.

This is not criminal malware. It is a component of 2345, a Chinese software group listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange, signed with the group's own certificates. It sends a machine ID and the network card's MAC address home over plain HTTP. CrowdStrike Falcon quarantined it on a corporate Windows machine on 3 November 2026, 21 days after it was built.

Where it comes from

The EDR quarantined the file and sent it to Falcon Sandbox, CrowdStrike's automatic detonation service. The sandbox gave it a threat score of 80 out of 100 and the verdict "malicious". What I received with the file:

How the file reached the machine is not known. The supplied files have no parent process and no command line. Everything below comes from reading the binary and those three files. Nothing was executed. As in the self-erasing crypter, the sandbox run turned out to show only a small part of the program, and the reason is in the code.

At a glance

Four gates decide what runs

Diagram of four gates. Gate 1, UAC consent for requireAdministrator, was passed in the sandbox and leads to the user-mode part that was seen: registry keys, files under AppData, a named pipe with no access control, 1 telemetry POST with MAC and machine id, and 18 failed driver-port connects. Gate 2, the -install argument, was closed because the sandbox gave none, so gate 3, a Windows build on a list of 19 builds, was not reached and the kernel driver exhlpfilter.sys was not seen. Gate 4, 2345Explorer installed, was closed, so the cloud settings fetched every 2 hours with TLS checks disabled were not seen.
Figure 1: the sandbox passed only the first gate, so it saw the user-mode part and nothing else

The sandbox started the file with no argument on a clean Windows 11. It passed gate 1 and stopped there.

Stage 1: the program without arguments

This is the part the sandbox saw. The process ran for the whole capture and was still alive at the last memory dump.

Timeline of the Falcon Sandbox run on 3 November 2026, UTC. 00:36:35 the file is submitted from EDR quarantine. Around 00:37:05 the process starts with no argument and creates its mutex, pipe and LockSDK registry key. Around 00:37:35 it finds 2345Explorer absent and makes no cloud call. 00:38:08.734 it sends POST /click/jiasux/realtime to t.keansoft[.]cn, 403 bytes, answered 200 OK. 00:39:35 the last memory dump shows it still running. From 00:37:05 to 00:39:35 it makes 18 attempts to open its driver port, all failing because no driver is installed.
Figure 2: three minutes, one beacon, 18 knocks on a driver that is not there

Falcon also flagged three memory pages that were writable and executable. Two hold hook trampolines of Falcon's own monitoring DLL, not code of the sample. The owner of the third is not identified.

Decoding the beacon

The POST has no User-Agent header and a gzip-compressed body. Unzipped, the body is a form:

http body | after gunzip
stat_version=1.0&product=browser_sdk&main_ver=2.0&version=2.0.0.1147&data=<316 characters>

The data field is URL-encoded twice, then base64, then XOR with a repeating 32-byte key stored in clear in the binary at address 0x957CB8:

xor key | .rdata 0x957CB8
1ffa95a0dc5d7972347eab09f1d2e52d

Reversing the four steps gives 234 bytes of JSON. The same 234 bytes sit in the process heap in two of the memory dumps, which confirms the decoding. Identifiers redacted:

json | decoded telemetry
{"common":{"A0000":"browser_sdk","A0001":"<machine id>","A0002":"2.0.0.1147",
  "A0309":{"f_version":0,"hurt":0,"s_version":""},"A0310":0,"A0311":1,"A1111":2,
  "A9000":"<MAC address>"},"integer":{"qd08":[0],"qd18":[0]}}

A0001 is a 2345 machine ID derived from the hardware. A9000 is the MAC address. Anyone on the network path can read both, since the key is fixed and the transport is plain HTTP.

Stage 2: -install and the kernel driver

The EXE carries the driver twice, as resources named DRV 2301 to 2304: the 32-bit build, the 64-bit build, and an identical copy of each. On -install it picks the right one, writes it to System32\drivers\exhlpfilter.sys and registers a service:

The name and the altitude look like a file-system filter. It is not one. It registers no file-system callbacks. It uses the filter manager only to open a communication port. The real work is a registry callback (CmRegisterCallback), a hook Windows calls before every registry operation.

The driver is not on the LOLDrivers list or Microsoft's vulnerable driver blocklist (checked on 5 November 2026).

How the driver picks its clients

The driver's port, \89446C4C-56A3-45A2-8D89-8827755C47EF, has a null access list: any process may try to connect. The driver then reads the last 0x68 bytes before the signature of the connecting program's file on disk. It expects a tag that reads 2345.com, a version number, and an ECDSA P-256 signature over the SHA-256 hash of the file up to the tag. It checks that signature with a public key stored in the driver.

hex | YsBrowserProtect.exe, file offset 0x733A00
0x68-byte block, placed just before the Authenticode certificate table
+0x00  char[32]  "2345.com", NUL padded   (the driver compares 8 bytes)
+0x20  uint32    1                         version
+0x24  uint32    0                         reserved
+0x28  byte[64]  ECDSA P-256 signature r||s over SHA-256(file up to the block)

The tag on this EXE is valid under the driver's key. Any 2345 program that carries a valid tag can drive the kernel component. The check is done once, at connection time, on the file and not on the code running in memory.

Stage 3: the remote switch

Every 2 hours, and only when 2345Explorer is installed, the program posts to https://api.qnchrome[.]com/ext/v1/cloud/sdk. The body uses the same XOR key as the telemetry. It reports the 2345 browser version and a 50-flag map of running security and analysis tools. The answer is a short settings object:

Key Effect
switchturns the default-browser monitor on or off
interval_hournext check, in hours (default 2)
pop_a, pop_bshow or skip each of the two warning pop-ups
pop_a_sec, pop_b_secpop-up timing, probably seconds
rulesallow-list of programs, signers and browser IDs whose changes are accepted

Two weaknesses matter. TLS certificate validation is turned off in both HTTP stacks the program uses, and the answer is not signed. Anyone in the network path can forge it. The damage is limited: no key carries a command, a URL or a file. A forged answer can only switch the browser lock on or off and change the pop-ups.

What it does on a machine

Not found anywhere in the code: persistence of its own (no Run key, service or task for the EXE), process injection, a downloader, credential or cookie theft, keylogging.

Who built it

Timeline of 13 October 2026, UTC. 09:12:20 the x64 and x86 drivers are linked, 6 seconds apart. 09:28:38 and 09:29:53 Microsoft attestation signs both drivers. 09:56:52 and 09:57:12 the EV signature of Shanghai Zuoyun Network Technology is added. 10:03:20 the EXE is linked with both drivers inside, and at 10:05:10 it is signed by 2345 Mobile. 53 minutes in total. Falcon quarantined the EXE 21 days later, on 3 November 2026.
Figure 3: one release pipeline, three signers, 53 minutes

Every name in the chain leads to the same company:

Other build traces:

The vendor's user agreement for its Qingniao browser describes a default-on "browser protection" with an opt-out. It is not CEIDPageLock, a 2018 criminal rootkit that impersonated 2345. None of its indicators appear here.

Detection points

Limits

What to do

Indicators of compromise

These identify vendor software, not an intrusion. Treat them as policy detections.

Type Value Note
SHA-256 8dac57d6fe5d129755bdbfca4ead01af21e9287c30c50879def664865c59fd9c YsBrowserProtect.exe 2.0.0.1147
MD5 38fbe99542a02c5259fb3f0078fc63eb same file
SHA-256 da8a9b8a47c825f4fde3f4c7b9a7cef9a46e4e291b047e4b192c7a7caa3c523d exhlpfilter.sys x64, resources DRV 2302 and 2304
SHA-256 5fba17b030b7e1d432e7591bba2f667fdd23f9ac89a74b1a86c9f5098fed1375 exhlpfilter.sys x86, resources DRV 2301 and 2303
Authenticode 79e669a5afaeb9541401b88562d33da7c8a1d00301be56459db402541f165371 x64 driver, for App Control deny rules
Authenticode 2f6802d85e8578d7c306135a25da5a1998069f3afc4e4657c49dd4750e70aa2a x86 driver, for App Control deny rules
Cert SHA-1 d37568707f79beee00f41a48db15486f026c9054 EV certificate of 上海佐云网络科技 on the driver
URL http://t.keansoft.cn/click/jiasux/realtime telemetry, observed
URL http://t.keansoft.cn/dump/browser_sdk crash upload, in code
URL https://api.qnchrome.com/ext/v1/cloud/sdk remote settings, in code
Domain gtm-djjs.2345.com, t-safe.2345.cc CNAME target of the telemetry host, and an alternate telemetry host in code
IP 180.163.203.54 telemetry server, AS4811; block the domain instead
Mutex Global\RCAV9A430E32-BC1D-4D9A-B97C-6B7D480EA20D_BP_MUTEX single instance
Pipe \\.\pipe\78A1A339-33F2-48A6-B2D2-7F3F7303C140_BP local control, null access list
Port \89446C4C-56A3-45A2-8D89-8827755C47EF driver communication port
Service exhlpfilter %SystemRoot%\System32\drivers\exhlpfilter.sys, start type 1
Registry HKLM\SOFTWARE\LockSDK\2.10, HKLM\SOFTWARE\2345PCSafe\2345Reg2, HKCU\SOFTWARE\2345.com\BROWSER_SDK, HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\LOCKSDK SDK and driver state
Path %APPDATA%\ysbrowsersdk\ working folder
String 1ffa95a0dc5d7972347eab09f1d2e52d telemetry XOR key