online lostsh.github.io download-farm | 2026-11-18 rfc 3514: evil bit not set
post 15 2026-11-18 lookalikes | seo | windows 95 domains

95 lookalike download sites, and the one that served malware

Lookalike domains | SEO | Electron | Windows 11 min read

A Rust player looks for Rust Tweaker, a tool that tunes the game's settings, and lands on rusttweaker[.]org. The Download button gives a small zip with a README. The README links to a 226 MB archive. Its install.exe asks for administrator rights every second until the user says yes, adds its folder to Microsoft Defender's exclusions, then decrypts and runs a Windows payload.

rusttweaker[.]org is one of 95 lookalike download sites run from one hosting reseller. Almost every other Download button leads to the real file of the tool the site copies. The payload on this one was hidden as 440,336 English words, one word per byte.

Where it started

The hunt for lookalike domains aimed at tech workers listed burpsuite[.]org as a fake Burp Suite site and left its download "not analysed". This post closes that point. The certificate of burpsuite[.]org led to 94 more domains, and every download they offer was checked. Nothing was executed.

The genuine Burp Suite page on portswigger.net, with the PortSwigger header and the Burp Suite product range. real: portswigger.net
The farm site burpsuite[.]org. Navy header, the heading Burpsuite Advanced Web Application Security Testing Platform, an orange Download Burpsuite button and a shield illustration. farm: burpsuite[.]org
Figure 1: the farm does not clone the vendor's page. It builds its own "download portal" around the name

How the farm was mapped

The site is not behind Cloudflare. It sits on 45.82.67.241, a shared server of Middlehost, a hosting reseller based in Karachi, Pakistan. Its Let's Encrypt certificate lists 20 names, and some look broken: www.burpsuite.org.angryipscanner.org.

They are not broken. cPanel, the control panel of most shared hosts, lets one account hold several sites. Each extra site, an "addon domain", gets an internal name made of the site plus the account's main domain. AutoSSL, cPanel's free certificate service, then puts those names on the certificate. So the certificate says which sites share an account, and which domain owns it.

  1. Read the certificate a site serves.
  2. Split every <addon>.<primary> name into two domains.
  3. Resolve each new domain, read its certificate, and repeat until no new name appears.
  4. Add a sweep of the daily new-domain lists from 1 to 17 November for names served by Middlehost's nameservers, to catch sites that are alone on their account.
Three panels. Panel 1: the certificate served by burpsuite[.]org, issued by Let's Encrypt on 2026-11-12 at 19:13:47 UTC with 20 names, including burpsuite[.]org, ilovejpg[.]org, noizio[.]org, pandamousepro[.]org, planswift[.]app, skse[.]org and the internal names www.burpsuite[.]org[.]angryipscanner[.]org, www.skse[.]org[.]angryipscanner[.]org, planswift[.]app[.]angryipscanner[.]org and *.org.angryipscanner[.]org, where angryipscanner[.]org is the account's primary domain. Panel 2: split each name into the visible site and the primary, then repeat for every new domain: 7 domains on this certificate, 31 with a nameserver sweep, 95 when no new name appears. Panel 3: domains per account: installyarn[.]com 20, linuxlite[.]org 17, balmmod[.]org 14, hackerbroma[.]org 12, angryipscanner[.]org 12, edexui[.]net 6, bootstrapicons[.]org 5, edexui[.]org 3, and 6 single sites with 1 each, on 4 Middlehost IPs: 45.82.67.241, 108.181.247.113, .122 and .126.
Figure 2: one certificate names the account, and each account names its sites

The loop stopped at 95 domains: 8 cPanel accounts with addon domains and 6 sites alone on their own certificate. The same trick works on cPanel hosts whose AutoSSL certificates carry the addon names, and Cert Spotter or crt.sh give the older certificates of a domain.

What the farm is

Mosaic of 24 farm sites on 18 November 2026: burpsuite, angryipscanner, sandboxie, tightvnc, phpmyadmin, osintframework, unificontroller, treesizefree, glaryutilities, intellijidea, raspberrypiimager, zorinos, manjaro, lsblk, xoutput, planswift, skse, lspdfr, lunarclient, optifine, minecolonies, rusttweaker, vnrombypass and noizio. Every page has the same layout: a header with a Download button, a large heading with one coloured word, two buttons and an illustration on the right.
Figure 3: 24 of the 79 sites that serve a page. One layout, a new name each time. The full mosaic opens on click

What the downloads are

Every sitemap page of the 95 domains was crawled for links to files, installers and download pages. Most buttons go to the vendor or to the project's GitHub. Ten sites host a file themselves. Each of those was checked against the original:

The third-party links were checked too. burpsuite[.]org points to a cracked Burp Suite Pro on GitHub and Google Drive: the 533 MB archive holds PortSwigger's official 2024.7.5 JAR (same size and CRC32) and the open-source BurpLoaderKeygen. It was read with HTTP range requests, without downloading it whole. That is piracy, not a trojan. mccommandcenter[.]org links the author's own Google Drive file. Some picks are careless: "Download Panda Mouse Pro" gives the source code of a different Android project, an ADB client.

The one that serves malware

TL;DR, what the payload does (quick reverse of every layer with keys found in the layer above):

  1. install.exe (79.6 MB) unpacks an Electron app whose main.js (5 MB) is obfuscated. The loader:
    • quits on virtual machines and sandboxes (it checks CPU, RAM, uptime, GPU, fans and machine names);
    • asks for admin rights every second until the user accepts;
    • adds its drop folder under %LOCALAPPDATA% and its own program to Microsoft Defender's exclusions;
    • decrypts a payload hidden after the end of a PNG image (AES-256-CBC) and runs it.
  2. That payload, gyhmlGIZJ.exe, is signed with a self-made certificate ("ColdGlen Ridge Ltd."). It stores the next file as 440,336 English words, one word per byte, then decrypts it with AES-256-CTR.
  3. The result is a 440 KB 64-bit Windows program with no readable strings. Family not identified; that would take a full reverse-engineering session.
Chain in eight boxes. Delivery: 1, rusttweaker[.]org, a 2 KB WordPress upload holding only a README copied from a GitHub lure repo. 2, share.google, Google's link shortener, 302 then 301. 3, bestload[.]click behind Cloudflare, one 301 to GitHub. 4, GitHub release instaII.zip, 226 MB, 570 files mostly junk, 487 downloads on 18 November at 09:14 UTC. Inside: 5, install.exe, a 79.6 MB 7-Zip self-extractor that unpacks an Electron app and runs xiuwmxjjse.exe, Electron 28.3.3, 177 MB. 6, app.asar main.js, 5 MB of obfuscated JavaScript with 3 base64 blobs forming a PNG with a payload after its IEND chunk, AES-256-CBC. 7, gyhmlGIZJ.exe, 2.8 MB, self-signed, payload stored as 440,336 English words, one word per byte, then AES-256-CTR. 8, the final 64-bit PE of 440 KB, strings encrypted, a 2022 timestamp that is likely false, family not identified. A dashed amber box, read in code and not run: main.js quits on VM or sandbox signs, asks for admin every second until yes, and excludes its folder from Defender.
Figure 4: four hops of links, four layers of packing, every key found in the layer above

1. The farm site and the redirect

rusttweaker[.]org runs WordPress. Its home page was created on 9 November at 18:03 (site time), and the zip behind the Download button was uploaded 30 minutes later. The zip holds one README, a copy of the GitHub repository Restraintnovapurify/Rust-Tweaker-Config-Architect. Its owner account and the repository were created on 21 June 2026, three minutes apart.

The README follows a template common to fake GitHub "download" repos: a big "DOWNLOAD, Click here" link, a Setup.exe to run, a "Legality" paragraph and a tag list. The link goes to share.google/JEV5AnVe5tQ1NYwgT, Google's own link shortener, then to bestload[.]click, then to a GitHub release:

http | redirect chain, 18 November
https://share.google/JEV5AnVe5tQ1NYwgT                      302
https://www.google.com/share.google?q=JEV5AnVe5tQ1NYwgT     301
https://bestload.click/                                     301
https://github.com/MarkVeteranFight/app2/releases/download/ert3t3/instaII.zip

The GitHub account was created on 15 August 2026. The release dates from 10 November, and its asset was replaced on 17 November at 10:09 UTC. It counted 438 downloads at 06:31 UTC on 18 November and 487 at 09:14 UTC. After the farm site, every hop but the gateway is a large platform people trust. The gateway is the one domain to block.

2. instaII.zip and install.exe

The name uses capital I's to read as "install". The 226 MB zip holds 570 files. Most are padding: random bytes (entropy 8.00) named source_127.yaml or stats_222.cob, spread over folders that also hold a Qt plugin and the modules of a Browser Automation Studio project. A file this big is often skipped by sandboxes and upload-based scanners.

The real file is install.exe, 79.6 MB, dated 17 November 10:33 in the zip. It is a stock 7-Zip 25.01 self-extractor whose configuration runs one program:

7z sfx | config at the start of the overlay
;!@Install@!UTF-8!
RunProgram="xiuwmxjjse.exe"
GUIMode="2"

The archive unpacks an Electron app: xiuwmxjjse.exe (177 MB, Electron 28.3.3's stock version information) and resources/app.asar. The logic sits in main.js inside the asar, 5 MB on a single line.

3. main.js, the loader

Every string is pulled from a table of 615 encoded entries. The decoder rotates the table 235 times, then applies base64 with a custom alphabet, RC4 with a per-call key, and UTF-8. Reimplemented in Python, it replaces the 1,272 calls and leaves 629 readable lines. In order, the script:

js | main.js, deobfuscated
// the PNG ends with IEND + CRC; the payload follows
const marker = Buffer.from([0,0,0,0,73,69,78,68,174,66,96,130]);
const body = blob.subarray(blob.lastIndexOf(marker) + marker.length);
const d = crypto.createDecipheriv("aes-256-cbc",
  Buffer.from("947904eca76ef3614c72861eec9e1cef9660a601e5b18fbc452202789db57851", "hex"),
  Buffer.from("4803b8e8d2f240adeca6131b8f2a98b9", "hex"));
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, "gyhmlGIZJ.exe"), Buffer.concat([d.update(body), d.final()]));

Two features are present and switched off. A list of seven fake crash messages ("MSVCP140.dll is missing", "0xc000007b") would be shown on exit, but its flag is "0". A second loader that reads a download URL from a Telegraph page is never called, and its page name and keys are empty. The loader adds no persistence.

4. gyhmlGIZJ.exe, the payload written in words

The dropped file is a 2.8 MB 64-bit program compiled on 17 November at 09:31 UTC. It poses as "Updater for Ping Target" by "ColdGlen Ridge Ltd., Inc.", with decoy settings, menus and status strings. Its signature is valid but self-signed: the certificate names itself as issuer, with a real DigiCert timestamp. Windows does not trust it.

Most of the file is text: 36,694 lines of exactly 12 words and one of 8, such as:

text | .rdata, first sentences
many name user new than why when module from animal help three
about about had only animal if because do still there set run
good number help so paper animal letter is why land too library

The sentences use exactly 256 distinct words. A table of 256 pointers at .rdata+0x6d0 gives each word its byte value. The decoder at 0x140001000 splits the text on whitespace, finds each word by a djb2 hash, and XORs the index with the repeating key bb 4e b6 a4. That gives 440,336 bytes of noise. The same function then builds an AES key from .rdata+0x360 (each byte XORed with 7*i + 0x11) and a 12-byte nonce from .rdata+0x380, and decrypts with AES-256 through Windows' BCrypt API (its stack strings name AES and ChainingModeECB), used as a counter mode with a little-endian counter.

python | static decoder, stage 4
table = {word_at(p): i for i, p in enumerate(ptrs)}       # 256 words
key4  = bytes([0xbb, 0x4e, 0xb6, 0xa4])
out   = bytes(table[w] ^ key4[i % 4] for i, w in enumerate(text.split()))
aes_key = bytes(rdata[0x360 + i] ^ ((7*i + 0x11) & 0xff) for i in range(32))
nonce   = rdata[0x380:0x38c]                                # counter: nonce + LE32(i)

Words keep the file's entropy low, so a scanner that flags packed or encrypted data sees plain English. The output starts with MZ and is a valid program.

5. The final payload

A 64-bit executable of 440,336 bytes with a February 2022 timestamp, probably false. Its imports are decoy GUI calls, and no readable string remains. The disassembly shows AES-NI instructions, constants that look like API name hashes, and CPUID and RDTSC instructions, which anti-VM checks use but ordinary runtime code also does. The family is not identified. A machine that ran install.exe and accepted the admin prompt should be treated as compromised.

Who is behind it, and why

No name. The evidence points to one operator:

The goal seen today is search traffic. Exact-match and expired domains, a "download" page for each tool, Search Console tags and AdSense-ready legal pages fit a farm that will sell ads or traffic once the pages rank. That is a reading of the setup, not an observation: no ad or tracking code was seen on any home page.

The malware is the exception, and its origin is narrow. The operator copied a GitHub lure repository as the "download" for one tool, the same way other sites copy a GitHub archive. Whether the operator knew is not known. The effect is the same for a visitor, and one operator controls the Download button of 95 sites: changing a link takes a minute.

Limits

What to do

Indicators of compromise

The farm's IP addresses are shared hosting with unrelated customers. Block the domains, not the IPs.

Type Value Note
URL hxxps://rusttweaker[.]org/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Rust-Tweaker-Config-Architect-main.zip Farm download, README only
URL hxxps://share[.]google/JEV5AnVe5tQ1NYwgT Short link in the README
Domain bestload[.]click Gateway, Cloudflare
URL hxxps://github[.]com/MarkVeteranFight/app2/releases/download/ert3t3/instaII.zip GitHub user id 317190020
URL github[.]com/Restraintnovapurify/Rust-Tweaker-Config-Architect Lure repo copied by the farm
SHA-256 ba5d19275943e734838681de95086abaf9b47906bbecc461d694b80a91702127 Rust-Tweaker-Config-Architect-main.zip
SHA-256 fc98272ffa0ebe39caf5cdba8fecc2180b5c84f6519607766b8e7fc1ea0bbe77 instaII.zip, 226,845,283 bytes
SHA-256 31942d0837ef8ec9366507dd7f0a65ba791ba7d55905f2d3b24b1a5f4bccaa2d install.exe, 7-Zip SFX
SHA-256 a83eec2f6018ac144dc6bf9b1cc911e24495faab39e802591944c89ea0bc2013 resources/app.asar
SHA-256 ea4d0be038cb788845fe340c76e02c37552d071411342095454d87ebfc7c6c28 main.js, obfuscated loader
SHA-256 5813bbbffa5d07b4883bdbcfec3f35bb2049c31afce820fe1de1b40ddfd9c4e2 gyhmlGIZJ.exe, "ColdGlen Ridge", self-signed
SHA-256 11ed12f209b0cdbc6f44c59a16f80060ecf521497814c71e330c0ab54285d860 Final payload, decoded in memory by gyhmlGIZJ.exe
Path %LOCALAPPDATA%\HoBnbIU\qyOFEkwt\iphKq\jxFuMJZD\gyhmlGIZJ.exe Drop path, excluded from Defender
Key 947904eca76ef3614c72861eec9e1cef9660a601e5b18fbc452202789db57851, IV 4803b8e8d2f240adeca6131b8f2a98b9 AES-256-CBC, stage 3
Key 016c1780ffef71df5e38150701eb9c926785d0e3c7b25cd7597f5c19a733758d, nonce def8df03cdc8280776cd91b3 AES-256-CTR, stage 4
Domain the 95 domains in the inventory below Farm, watch list
IP 45.82.67.241, 108.181.247.113, 108.181.247.122, 108.181.247.126 Middlehost shared servers, context only
Inventory: the 95 domains, their account and what their Download button gives

Seen on 17 and 18 November 2026. "Account" is the cPanel primary domain named in the certificates. "Upstream" means the vendor's site or the project's own repository.

Domain Account Registered Download
alvr[.]app angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 self-hosted, identical to upstream
angryipscanner[.]org angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 upstream site
burpsuite[.]org angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 cracked Burp Pro: official JAR + open-source keygen
flowbite[.]net angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 upstream GitHub
ilovejpg[.]org angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 no download link
jsmpeg[.]org angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 self-hosted, identical to upstream
minecolonies[.]org angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 upstream GitHub
noizio[.]org angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 self-hosted, identical to upstream
pandamousepro[.]org angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 GitHub archive of an unrelated project
planswift[.]app angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 self-hosted, PlanSwift-signed installer
sandboxie[.]app angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 upstream GitHub
skse[.]org angryipscanner[.]org 2026-11-07 upstream GitHub
4kvideodownloader[.]co balmmod[.]org not published upstream site
agenttoolbar[.]org balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 no download link
balmmod[.]org balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site
batchdialer[.]org balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site
elvui[.]app balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream GitHub
lunarclient[.]app balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site
manjaro[.]app balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 self-hosted, copy of Manjaro release-review repo
mccommandcenter[.]org balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 author's own Google Drive file
moewalls[.]org balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 no download link
osintframework[.]app balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream GitHub
phpmyadmin[.]app balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site
rusttweaker[.]org balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 malware: README to share.google, bestload[.]click, GitHub
scratchjr[.]net balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site, app store
turbowarp[.]app balmmod[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream GitHub
bootstrapicons[.]org bootstrapicons[.]org 2026-11-08 no download link
gitbash[.]app bootstrapicons[.]org 2026-11-08 empty directory listing
jibble[.]app bootstrapicons[.]org 2026-11-08 HTTP 403
krnlexecutor[.]app bootstrapicons[.]org 2026-11-08 empty directory listing
rpcsx[.]app bootstrapicons[.]org 2026-11-08 empty directory listing
codeigniter[.]app edexui[.]net 2026-11-07 upstream site, upstream GitHub
edexui[.]net edexui[.]net 2026-11-07 upstream GitHub
enderal[.]org edexui[.]net 2026-11-07 no download link
instander[.]org edexui[.]net 2026-11-07 upstream site
postcss[.]net edexui[.]net 2026-11-07 upstream GitHub
toonsquid[.]net edexui[.]net 2026-11-07 app store
edexui[.]org edexui[.]org 2026-03-16 self-hosted, identical to upstream
glaryutilities[.]info edexui[.]org not published self-hosted, README without link
treesizefree[.]org edexui[.]org 2026-11-07 self-hosted, Microsoft Store web installer
geniusscan[.]org geniusscan[.]org 2026-11-04 app store
browsecvpn[.]net hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site, upstream GitHub
chimeratool[.]app hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site
easycomment[.]org hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 no download link
hackerbroma[.]org hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 no download link
interfont[.]org hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 self-hosted, official Inter 4.1 zip
iriunwebcam[.]net hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site, app store
makemkv[.]app hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site
standardnotes[.]app hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site, upstream GitHub
unificontroller[.]org hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 vendor site, plus a third-party install gist
voicemeter[.]net hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site
zorinos[.]org hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site
zplviewer[.]org hackerbroma[.]org 2026-11-03 no download link
highcharts[.]app highcharts[.]app 2026-11-04 empty directory listing
impressjs[.]net impressjs[.]net 2026-11-04 upstream GitHub
aeroinstagram[.]com installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 HTTP 404
aicoustics[.]net installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream site
audiobookbay[.]app installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream GitHub
borneoschematic[.]org installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 MediaFire installer, not checked
ealauncher[.]com installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream site
faceitfinder[.]org installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream GitHub
immersiveengineering[.]org installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream site
installyarn[.]com installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream GitHub
intellijidea[.]app installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream site
kappashaders[.]com installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream GitHub
morphordservice[.]net installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream site
nivocharts[.]com installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream GitHub
openguesser[.]org installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream GitHub
optifine[.]app installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream site
raspberrypiimager[.]com installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream site, upstream GitHub
unlockff[.]org installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 APKPure XAPK of a Play Store app, not checked
vnrombypass[.]org installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 APK on apktodo, third party, not checked
vpnsuperunlimitedproxy[.]org installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 App Store, APKPure XAPK, not checked
xmousebuttoncontrol[.]org installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream site
zlib[.]app installyarn[.]com 2026-11-03 upstream GitHub
kwiky[.]net kwiky[.]net 2026-11-04 empty directory listing
chitubox[.]app linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 parked, page not seen
cristaldiskinfo[.]com linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 parked, page not seen
gachaeditx[.]com linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 parked, page not seen
gregtech[.]app linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 no download link
linuxlite[.]org linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 guide page, no download link
lspdfr[.]net linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 download.it link, expired token
m5burner[.]com linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 vendor CDN, plus a GitHub mirror
mediaget[.]app linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream site
momentjs[.]org linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 parked, page not seen
mousetimer[.]org linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 app store
prime95[.]org linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 parked, page not seen
pyautogui[.]net linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 parked, page not seen
superantispyware[.]app linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 parked, page not seen
terragrunt[.]app linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 parked, page not seen
tightvnc[.]app linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 GitHub mirror (not the vendor)
truenasscale[.]org linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 parked, page not seen
waydroid[.]org linuxlite[.]org 2026-11-03 upstream GitHub
lsblk[.]net lsblk[.]net 2026-11-04 upstream site
xoutput[.]net xoutput[.]net 2026-11-04 upstream GitHub